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1I. Introduction
In 1997-98, five private college and university presidents earned more than
$500,000 in salaries and benefits. One reporter quipped in a recent story in the Chronicle
of Higher Education, “If you’re a private college president and you are not making at
least $300,000 a year, maybe its time to renegotiate your contract”.1
To many faculty members at private doctoral level, comprehensive and
baccalaureate institutions whose average compensation in 1997-98 was $91,972, $64,774
and $64,286, respectively, compensation packages for presidents of these magnitudes
seem way out of line.2 These presidents, however, are the chief executive officers (CEOs)
of institutions whose operating budgets sometimes reach well over $1 billion a year.
Viewed from this perspective, private college and university presidents are paid
considerably less than their CEO counterparts who head similar size for-profit
corporations. Nonetheless, just as some have argued that corporate CEOs are “over paid”,
high compensation levels or compensation increases for some college presidents have
recently been well-publicized, criticized and used as examples of waste and inefficiency in
higher education.3
Surprisingly, very little is known about the compensation structure faced by
American college and university presidents. A long literature exists with respect to
corporate CEOs that shows that their compensation is often either explicitly or implicitly
structured in a way that provides incentives for them to act in their shareholders’
                                                 
1 Steven Burd (1999)
2 American Association of University Professors (1998), table 4.
2interests.4 Studies have found that incentives also appear to exist in the compensation
structures of appointed government executives, such as city managers and school
superintendents, that “encourage” them to act in their constituents’ interests.5 However,
the few studies that have addressed private college and university presidents’
compensation have only used cross-section data to explain differences in compensation
across institutions.6 A  we shall show, such data do not enable researchers to ascertain if
academic presidents’ compensation is structured in a way that provides incentives for them
to act in the best interests of their institutions’ constituents.
A private academic institution’s constituents include its students, faculty and
alumni. Its constituents also include corporations, private foundations and federal, state
and local governments. However, in the end it is the board of trustees of the institutions at
which a president is employed that determines his or her compensation and tenure in
office. So ultimately our paper is an effort to infer what the trustees of private academic
institutions value.
Our study makes use of data from a panel of over 400 private colleges and
universities on the salaries and benefits paid to their presidents. These data are reported
annually to the Internal Revenue Service on Form 990 by the institutions. The data have
been collected by, and reported in, the Chronicl of Higher Education for academic years
                                                                                                                                      
3 For example, the New York State Board of Regents ruled in 1997 that the pay and benefits of Adelphi
University’s president Peter Diamandopoulos was excessive and then disbanded the Adelphi Board of
Trustees for failing to exercise adequate fiduciary responsibility.
4 See Kevin J. Murphy (1999)
5 See for example, Gerald Goldstein and Ronald Ehrenberg (1976) and Ronald Ehrenberg, Richard
Chaykowski and Randy Ehrenberg (1988).
6 See for example, Kim Boulanger and Jeffrey Pliskin (1999) and Jeffrey Pfeffer and Jerry Ross (1988)
31992-93 through 1997-98.7 We use these data through 1996-97 and merge them with data
from a number of other sources including the American Association of University
Professors, the American Council on Education, Who’s Who in America, the National
Association of College and University Business Officers, the Council on Aid to Education,
and the National Science Foundation’s CASPAR system.  This permits us to estimate
salary and compensation level and change equations.
The plan of our paper is as follows. We begin by providing some descriptive
statistics on the compensation and mobility of American private college and university
presidents, as well as on their personal characteristics. The next section estimates a model
of the determinants of presidents’ salary and compensation levels.  We then exploit the
longitudinal nature of our data and present analyses of presidents’ salary and
compensation changes. A brief concluding section summarizes our finding.
II. Descriptive Statistics
Each year private colleges and universities report the salaries and benefits of their
five highest paid employees to the Internal Revenue Service on Form 990. If the president
of an institution is not among the five highest paid employees, the institution is also
required to report the same information for the president.8 Starting with the data for
academic year 1992-93 (for salary) and 1993-94 (for benefits), the Chronicle of Higher
Education has collected and published information on private 4-year college and university
presidents’ compensation for a set of institutions. The set includes those institutions that
                                                 
7 Presidents’ salary data have been reported since 1992-93, however presidents’ benefits data are available
only since 1993-94.
8 This situation arises most often when a medical college is part of a university.
4are classified as research, doctoral, comprehensive and liberal arts I by the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1994).
At the outset, we must acknowledge that these data are subject to considerable
measurement errors. Sometimes institutions fail to report deferred compensation that was
“earned” during the year. Sometimes they fail to report the portion of the president’s
compensation that comes from “related “ organizations, such as university foundations.
Institutions always exclude any compensation that the president receives from corporate
or foundations boards on which he or she sits, even if the board membership is implicitly
part of the president’s compensation and is arranged by a key trustee or alumnus of the
institution. Finally, institutions sometimes under-value or fail to report “perks” that the
president receives as part of his or her compensation package. Nonetheless, the data from
the form 990 reports are the best private college and university presidents’ compensation
data that are publicly available.
Table 1 presents data on the mean salaries of 4-year private college and university
presidents annually for 1992-93 to 1997-98. Similar data are reported for the sum of
salaries and benefits for 1993-94 to 1997-98. The means are reported each year in the
aggregate and separately for Carnegie category research, doctoral, comprehensive and
liberal arts institutions. Presidents have been excluded from this table if they had salaries
less than $40,000 a year, were interim or part-year presidents, or if their salary data were
not reported in a year.
The average president’s salary was over $185,000 in 1997-98. President’s average
salaries vary widely across the Carnegie Foundation categories of institutions, however,
ranging from a low of almost $160,000 at comprehensive institutions to a high of over
5$343,000 at research universities. When reported benefits are added to the presidents’
salaries to get a measure of their compensation, average compensation varied from about
$187,000 at the comprehensive institutions to over $393,000 at the research universities.
How have the presidents’ salaries and benefits changed over time? Panel A of table
2 presents information on the distribution of the president’s salary changes during the
1992-93 to 1996-97 period, in the aggregate and by category of institution. Excluded from
this table are presidents who began their terms of office after 1992-93, presidents who left
their positions prior to 1996-97 and presidents whose institutions were not present in the
sample each year.
During the 1992-93 to 1996-97 period, the presidents received an average 25.5
percent increase in salary. The median salary increase was 20.8 percent. Presidents of
research universities and liberal arts colleges fared slightly better, on average, than their
counterparts at doctoral and comprehensive institutions did. To focus on the average
increases, however, is to ignore the variation in the increases that occurred across
presidents. Indeed, the 25th to 75th percentile range for presidents’ salary increases during
the period was about 13 to 33 percent.
Each year, average salary increases for faculty members differ across institutions.
Hence, it is natural to ask how the presidents’ salary increases varied relative to the
changes in the average salaries of the faculty members at their institutions.9 As panel B f
the table indicates, the average salary increase of the presidents exceeded the average
                                                 
9 We caution that we truly are comparing apples and oranges here. A president’s salary change is the
growth of a single individual’s earnings over time. The change in the average faculty salary at an
institution is determined both by the percentage change in the salary pool that is provided by the
institution each year and the change of the distribution of faculty members across ranks and ages during
the period.
6salary increase of faculty at their institutions by 13.5 percentage points during the period.
Presidents of research universities gained less relative to their faculty than did presidents at
other categories of institutions. The median differences between the salary increases of
presidents and their faculty members’ average salary increases are somewhat smaller in the
aggregate and in each institutional category. There is considerable variation in this
difference across all institutions and across institutions within each institutional category.
The 25th to 75th percentile range for this measure across all institutions was 0.8 to 21.0
percentage points. However, as panel B indicates, some president’s salaries increased at
rates that were slower than the rate of increase of their faculty members’ average salaries
during the period.
Data on the benefits received by the president’s are available starting in 1993-94.
In panels C and D of the table we examine how increases in presidents’ pay (panel C) and
pay plus benefits (panel D) compared to the increases in the average salary of faculty at
their institutions during the three-year period 1993-94 to 1996-97. The pattern of results
for presidents’ pay is very similar to that reported in the previous panel, although the
increases are somewhat smaller because we are now using one less year of data. When
presidents’ pay plus benefits is used, the patterns are again similar.
Our empirical analyses in section IV will address the relationship between salary
increases and “institutional performance” for presidents who remain at their position for a
four-year period. This may understate the reward president’s receive for performance if
part of the reward comes in the form of opportunities for the movement to other higher
7paying positions.10 So it is important to understand what the mobility pattern of individuals
in the sample actually looks like.
 Table 3 summarizes where each president who was in the sample either in 1993-
94, 1994-95, 1995-96, or 1996-97 was in the following year. A few institutions that report
data in one year do not report it in the next year and we cannot follow their presidents’
careers. About 90% of the presidents in the sample each year were at the same institution
the next year. In total, only 7 individuals moved to a presidency at another private
institution that was in the sample during the four-year period.  Finally, between 5 to 12
percent of the presidents in the sample in each year (26 to 48 in number) were not
observed in the sample the next year.
Our empirical analyses of presidents’ salary and compensation changes in section
IV are restricted to those presidents who remained in office through 1996-97, because
data on several of the explanatory variables we use in the salary change models were not
available for 1997-98 at the time we wrote the paper. One hundred sixteen of the
presidents had left the sample by 1996-97. A search of Who’s W o in America provided
biographical information for slightly less than half of them. Information on subsequent
activities for all but 2 of the remaining presidents who had left the sample by 1996-97 was
obtained from exhaustive searches of the World Wide Web that we conducted and a
phone survey of Presidents’ offices conducted by Cornell’s Computer Assisted Survey
Team (CAST) in May 2000.
                                                 
10 Ehrenberg, Chaykowski and Ehrenberg (1988) showed that the reward for school superintendents who
were “high performers” was most often opportunities for mobility to positions in larger better paying
school districts and less often, larger salary increases in their current school district.
8 The post presidency activities of the presidents who left the sample were varied.
Sixty-four were retired or president-emeritus, while 5 were presidents at institutions that
were not included in our sample. Nine held administrative positions below the rank of
president or faculty positions at other academic institutions, while 7 had returned to the
faculty at their own, predominantly liberal arts, institutions. Twenty were employed in the
government or nonprofit sectors, primarily as executives or trustees of private
foundations; this latter group also included a congressman and an ambassador Finally, 6
were self-employed, often as consultants, or employed in the corporate world and 3 were
deceased.
Interestingly, only one individual who was a president in our sample in any year
moved to a presidency of a public college or university during the period. Table 4 presents
data from an annual survey of the pay of academic administrators conducted by the
College and University Personnel Association (CUPA) that sheds some light on why this
lack of mobility to the public sector occurred.
 We caution that the public and private institutions that respond to the CUPA
survey are not a random sample. Hence the reader should not presume that the average
salary figures we report below are accurate estimates for the populations of public and
private institutions. In addition, we do not have access to the CUPA data at the individual
institutional level and are restricted to making comparisons from the data in the way that
are reported in the CUPA report. Despite these weaknesses, the CUPA data do permit us
to compare public and private presidents’ median salaries, along with two measures of the
relative size of their institutions.
9 The top panel of the table indicates that the median size public institution in the
CUPA sample in 1999 had an annual operating budget of $50.5 million, while the median
size private institution had a budget of $34.8 million. The salaries of the presidents at the
median private and public institutions were $132,098 and $176,800, respectively. Thus,
although the median private institution had an operating budget that was only .689 times
the operating budget of the median public institution, the ratio of the median private
president’s salary to the median public president’s salary was 1.338. The bottom panel of
the table presents similar data when the institutions are ranked by enrollment size. It yields
the same conclusion; namely that presidents of private institutions get paid considerably
more than their counterparts at public institutions even though their counterparts lead
substantially larger institutions.11
Who are the presidents in our sample? Table 5 presents some background data on
their characteristics, as of 1996-97. The typical president in our sample began his or her
presidency at the age of 48 and had been in the position for over 8 years. About 15
percent of the presidents were members of the clergy and these clergy-presidents are
found most often in comprehensive institutions. About 18 percent of the presidents were
females, but the percentage of female presidents at research and doctoral institutions was
only 8 percent. Finally one quarter of the presidents held at least one prior presidency
before assuming their current position. We were able to identify the institution in which
the prior presidency was held for 57 of these individuals. Almost three-quarters of the
prior presidencies were at other private, primarily 4-year institutions. The other quarter of
prior presidencies were at individual public campuses or statewide public systems. Among
                                                 
11 The slight difference in the median salaries in the two panels of the table probably reflects incomplete
10
the presidents who previously held public presidencies were the presidents of three Ivy
League institutions. Each of these three previously had been a president at a Big Ten
institution.
III. Analyses of Presidents’ Salary and Compensation Levels12
What might be hypothesized to determine the salary and compensation level of an
American private college or university president? On the one hand, we expect that the
characteristics of the president will matter, including years in the position, whether the
president held a prior presidency, and, if so, the number of years of experience at that
position. Presidents who are members of the clergy might be expected to have lower
salaries because they are less motivated by market forces and often are presidents of
religious affiliated institutions. Holding constant prior experience and tenure in the
position, evidence that a president’s age or gender influence his or her salary might reflect
different market conditions for presidents with these types of characteristics or the
operation of age or gender discrimination in the market for presidents.
Characteristics of the institution that affect the responsibility that the president has
such as the size, as measured by enrollments, and complexity, as measured by institutional
type and the level of research volume (for research and doctoral institutions), should
matter. Variables that reflect the revenues coming into the institution should also matter.
Institutions with higher endowments per student, larger enrollments, higher average
faculty salaries and entering classes with higher average test scores should also pay higher
salaries to presidents. The latter variable is expected to be important because the academic
                                                                                                                                      
data from some institutions on either budgets or enrollments.
12 The empirical models in this section are similar in spirit to those found in Boulanger and Pliskin (1999)
who use presidents’ compensation data for 1995-96 obtained from the Chronicle of Higher Education.
11
selectivity of an institution affects it applicant flow, its yield on accepted applicants, the
level of tuition that it can charge and the fraction of its tuition that it must give back to
students in the form of grant aid to induce them to attend the institution.
 Column 1 of table 6 presents estimates of the determinants of the logarithm of a
president’s salary, using data pooled across presidents/institutions and years for the 1992-
93 to 1996-97 period.  With slightly more than 400 presidents per year and 5 years of
data, we have more than 2000 observations. The explanatory variables in the model
include the president’s age, gender, tenure in position, whether a prior presidency was
held, the tenure at the prior presidency, whether the president is a member of the clergy.
The logarithms of endowment per student, annual fund raising level per student, full-time
equivalent enrollment, the average salary of professors at the institution and the
institution’s research and development expenditures (for research and doctoral
institutions) are also included in the model13. Also included is an estimate of the average
SAT scores of enrolled freshman at the institution, dichotomous variables for the year that
the observation comes from and dichotomous variables to control for non-reporting of
many of the included variables. The data appendix provides the source for each variable.
It is plausible to hypothesize that doctoral and research universities are more
difficult to lead than comprehensive universities, which are in turn more difficult to lead
than liberal arts institutions. The presence of a substantial volume of research, along with
large Ph.D. programs increases the complexity of the doctoral and research universities
and adds another set of objectives that their presidents must be concerned about that
presidents of comprehensives do not face. The multiplicity of programs present at the
12
comprehensives, as compared to the liberal arts colleges, may lead the presidencies of the
comprehensive to be more difficult jobs than the presidencies of liberal arts colleges. If this
is the case, institutional type per se may be an important determinant of presidents’ salaries
and we also include dichotomous variables for institutional type in our estimating
equation.
The coefficient estimates for this model are found in column 1 of table 6. They
imply that presidents’ receive about 0.6 percent higher salaries a year for each year of
tenure in their current position and 0.5 percent higher salaries for each year of tenure in a
prior presidency.14 Presidents who are members of the clergy receive about 19% less than
other presidents, other factors held constant. Higher endowments per student,
enrollments, and average faculty salaries are all associated with higher presidents’ salaries,
but the annual fund raising level per student is not. Finally, an increase in average SAT
scores of 100 points at an institution is associated with about a 2 percent increase in the
president’s salary.
The estimated coefficients also suggest that presidents of research and doctoral
universities receive salaries that are about 12 percent higher, other variables held constant,
than their colleagues at other institutional types. However, presidents of comprehensive
universities do not appear to receive a pay premium relative to presidents of liberal arts
colleges, once we control for other variables in the model.
 The remaining columns of table 6 present coefficient estimates that test the
sensitivity of our findings to various permutations of the data and assumptions. Column
                                                                                                                                      
13  Interestingly, endowment per student and annual fund raising level per student are not very highly
correlated across institutions in the sample.
13
(2) presents coefficient estimates of the identical model save that the dependent variable is
now the logarithm of compensation (salary plus reported benefits). The sample size is
reduced because data on presidents’ benefits were reported in the Chr nicle of Higher
Education only starting in 1993-94. However, the pattern of results is very similar to those
in the previous column.
The models estimated so far specify that a president’s salary is related to the
average salary of faculty at the same institution. A goal of the next section will be to see if
we can “explain” differences across institutions in the rate of growth of presidential
compensation relative to the rate of growth of faculty compensation. However, it is
reasonable to argue here that average faculty salary is endogenous and determined by
many of the same forces that influence a president’s salary. So in column (3) we present
coefficients of the president’s salary equation that omit the average professor salary
variable.
The coefficients of the variables in this equation are very similar to the
corresponding coefficients found reported in column (1). As we expected, the coefficients
of endowment per student, enrollment and freshman test scores increase in magnitude,
with the impact of the level of average SAT scores on presidents’ salaries tripling in
magnitude. The increases in the magnitudes of these variables’ coefficients occur because
part of these variables impact on presidents’ salaries operated in the previous equations
through their effects on average faculty salaries.
Column (4) of table 6 presents estimates of coefficients from the same president’s
salary equation that is found in column (1). We have omitted from the estimation sample
                                                                                                                                      
14 We experimented with including quadratic terms in current and prior tenure to allow for diminishing
14
here any year-president observation in which the president was in the last year of his or her
tenure. However, this restriction leads to only marginal changes in any of the estimated
coefficients. Finally, in column (5), we exclude all presidents who are clergy from the
sample. This exclusion does not significantly change any of the remaining coefficients in
the model.
The estimates presented in table 6 assume that the impact of any explanatory
variable on a president’s salary, other than the dichotomous variable for institutional type
is the same for presidents at all types of institutions. To see whether this is true, we
estimate our basic model for each institutional type, both including and excluding, average
faculty salaries from the equations. The estimated coefficients from these models appear in
Table 7.
These results suggest that it is important to stratify of the data by institutional type
when analyzing presidents’ salaries.  Remembering that all finding are ceter s paribus
(other variables in the model held constant), we find the following: A president’s age is
positively associated with salary for research and doctorate universities, but negatively
associated for liberal arts colleges. Female presidents receive 3 to 6 percent less than male
presidents at comprehensive universities, but about 3.5 percent more than male presidents
at liberal arts colleges.15 Years of tenure at the current and at any past presidency do not
affect salaries of presidents of research and doctoral universities. Both tenure measures are
positively associated with the salaries of comprehensive university president’s, however
only tenure on the current job matters for liberal arts college presidents. Increases in
                                                                                                                                      
returns to tenure but these variables’ coefficients never proved to be statistically significant.
15 Additional analyses suggest that this latter differential is not solely a “women’s college” effect. Female
presidents of coeducational liberal arts colleges also receive higher salaries than their male counterparts.
15
endowment per student have the largest impact on presidents’ salaries at liberal arts
colleges and increases in freshman SAT scores do not lead to higher salaries for the
presidents of research and doctoral universities. Finally, at research and doctoral
institutions, the level of the president’s salary is positively associated with the institution’s
level of research and development expenditures.16
IV Analyses of Presidents’ Salary and Compensation Changes
Interesting as they are, the results presented in the previous section tell us little
about whether private college university presidents are rewarded for their “performance”.
To say, for example, that wealthier institutions with larger endowments pay higher salaries
to their presidents, is not the same thing as saying that presidents whose institutions’
endowments grow at above average rates receive, other factors held constant, above
average salary increases. Indeed while the first statement has been shown to be true, there
are good reasons why the second statement should not be true.
To see this, note that the growth of an institution’s endowment depends upon four
factors the total rate of return on the institution’s endowment, the fraction of the
endowment value that the institution spends each year (its “spending rate”), the total level
of gifts to the institution in a year, and the fraction of those gifts which are placed in the
endowment rather than being used to fund current expenditures or capital projects. The
total rate of return on the endowment depends heavily on market conditions and the
investment policies specified by the trustees of the institution and the president has little
influence over these factors. Similarly, the institution’s trustees determine the “spending
                                                 
16 Substitution of federally funded research and development expenditures for this measure in the model
yielded a similar positive relationship.
16
rate”. While the president can marshal arguments to influence the trustees’ decision, such
arguments do not always carry the day.
The president plays a major role, often the major role, in determining the
institution’s fund raising success. Decisions on the current and capital budgets to
recommend to the trustees ultimately also rest with the president. If a president’s salary
increases were tied to the growth in the endowment, this would provide him or her with
an incentive to skimp on capital projects and to not devote any spending of annual gifts on
current operations.
This line of reasoning suggests that it would be foolish for trustees to tie a
president’s salary or compensation growth to the growth rate of the institution’s
endowment. A much better strategy would be to reward the president for maintaining an
already high level of annual fund raising or for increasing the institution’s fund raising
levels. So we expect to find relationships between fund raising success and presidents’
salary and compensation increases, rather than between endowment changes and their
salary and compensation increases.
Boards of trustees have been strongly advised by two successful university
presidents (one now doing other things) that the best way to reward a successful president
is via the route of deferred compensation payments, which are not as “visible” as annual
salary increases. They also note that such payments are often explicitly tied to presidents’
success in raising funds.17 Hence we expect that the performance-compensation
relationship will be stronger than the performance-salary relationship.
                                                 
17  James L. Fisher and James V. Koch (1996), chapter 20.
17
However, teasing out any relationships that exist between presidents’ salary or
compensation changes and their “performance” will not be an easy task. Explicit or
implicit incentive payments may occur at discrete points in time, which differ across
presidents. For example, the highest paid president in 1997-98 was a liberal arts college
president who was rewarded a hefty retirement package in recognition of his years of
outstanding service to the college. The chairman of the college’s board of trustees credited
the president for having built the college’s endowment, reduced its debt and enhanced its
academic reputation during his 28 years of service to the institution.18 Because this reward
for performance was a discrete one that came at the end of the president’s term, focusing
on the relationship between his compensation change and the institution’s performance
over any period of time that did not include his last year in office, would drastically
understate the long-run relationship.
Similarly large compensation increases may be used as a way of “encouraging” a
president to voluntarily resign and thus may reflect “nonperformance” rather than
performance. One long-term comprehensive university president who retired from his
position in 1997-98 was widely blamed for the financial difficulties that his institution had
suffered during his last years in office. His large increase in compensation during his last
year of office included a retirement package and a severance payment that will be paid out
over time. In accordance with IRS regulations, such payments were recorded as deferred
compensation in the year that they were granted.19
If we exclude presidents who are in their last year of service from our sample, we
run the risk of substantially understating the relationship between compensation changes
                                                 
18 See Stephen Burd (1999).
18
and performance. On the other hand, if we include them, we run the risk that large
increases in compensation may reflect attempts to “buy presidents out” and bad
performance, rather than good performance. Either way, if data that span a relatively
short-time period are used, it is unlikely that we will observe a tight compensation change
performance relationship.
The results of our efforts to estimate such a relationship appear in table 8.  The
estimates in the table are based upon the sample of presidents who remained in the same
position between academic years 1992-93 and 1996-97 when salary changes are analyzed
and 1993-94 to 1996-97 when compensation changes are analyzed. In column (1), the
logarithm of the president’s salary in 1996-97 minus the logarithm of his salary in 1992-
93, a measure of his percentage salary change over a 4 year period, is specified to depend
upon the type of institution that the president leads, the change in each of the institutional
level variables used in the analyses of the presidents’ salary levels.
 Presidents’ salary changes during the period are seen to be positively and
statistically significantly associated with their institutions’ enrollment growth, average
professor salary growth and, for research universities, their institutions’ growth in research
and development expenditures.20 While a positive association between presidents’ salary
growth and the growth in annual giving at institutions is observed, this relationship is not
                                                                                                                                      
19 Burd (1999).
20 Additionally analyses indicate that research and doctorate university presidents’ salary growth is also
significantly associated with the growth in total external (federal state and corporate) research and
development funding at their institutions.
19
statistically significant.  Institutional type, per se, does not appear to be associated with
salary growth.21
The estimates in column (1) are for a model that permits the personal
characteristics that were assumed to influence presidents’ salary levels in tables 6 and 7 to
also influence presidents’ salary changes. These characteristics are “dated” as of the 1992-
93. Presidents with more seniority in their position received larger salary increases during
the period than presidents with less seniority. Presidents who held a previous presidency
received smaller salary increases. Finally, presidents who were members of the clergy also
received smaller salary increases during the period.
In column (2) we use compensation changes rather than salary changes as the
dependent variable. Inasmuch as compensation includes deferred payments and, as noted
above, deferred payments are believed to be the route via which a good deal of the pay for
performance for presidents’ occurs, we expect the compensation change model to
“outperform” the salary change model. While we caution that the compensation change
data cover fewer years (because the Chronicle first reported benefit data for 1993-94), in
fact the opposite is true. We are less successful in explaining presidents’ compensation
changes than we are in explaining their salary changes.22 The only variable that proves to
be statistically significant is the change in research and development expenditure variable
for the research universities. Reporting errors in the benefits (deferred compensation) data
                                                 
21 We also estimated presidents’ annual salary change equations using annual measure of “performance”
and pooling the data across years. The fit of these models was very poor and many fewer variables were
significant in each equation
22 When we estimated the presidents’ salary change equation for the shorter period, its fit was somewhat
poorer than the fit of the model reported in table 1, but still better than that of the compensation equation.
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and the timing of deferred compensation awards make inferring relationships from the
compensation change data very difficult.
Returning to the salary change data, in column (3) we present estimates of a model
that excluded average faculty salary growth because this variable is likely influenced by
several of the other variables in the model. The parameter estimates that we obtain are
very similar to those obtained in column (1). In column (4), we reestimate the model,
excluding presidents who are in the last year of their presidency. Doing so improves the fit
of the model and increases in the level of external gifts per student received are now se n
to be significantly positively related to the presidents’ salary increases. Finally in column
(5) we exclude presidents who are clergy from the sample; this only marginally changes
the remaining coefficients of the model.
Table 9 estimates presidents’ salary level change equations with the data stratified
by institutional type. Presidents’ salary changes are associated with their faculty members’
average salary increases at all three types of institutions, with the relationship being
strongest at the research/doctoral institutions. Research and development expenditure
changes are associated with presidents’ salary changes at the latter institutions and
president’s salaries at comprehensive institutions are associated with their institutions’
enrollment growth over the period. However, none of our other performance measures
ever proves significant.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Taken together, our results provide only weak support for the hypothesis that
presidents’ salary and compensation changes are related to measures of their institutions’
performance. Somewhat surprisingly freshman test score changes are not associated with
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president’s salary growth. Only when presidents in their last year of tenure are excluded
from the sample are presidents’ salary increases associated with improvements in their
fund raising success. Reporting error problems and the problems associated with the
timing of deferred payments made it difficult for us to tease out any behavioral
relationships from the presidents’ compensation change equations.
Our salary and compensation change analyses are for a sample of presidents who
remain in office for a four-year period during the 1990s. It may well be the case that the
major rewards that presidents receive for their performance are continued tenure in office,
and opportunity to retire at later ages, or opportunities to move to higher paying positions
in either the academic or nonacademic sectors. In future work we hope to explore the
determinants of presidents’ tenure in office, retirement ages, and mobility to different
positions.
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                                                Data Appendix
Compensation Data
We use College President’s compensation data from the Chronicle of Higher Education’s
pay-and-benefit survey, which restricts us to studying private institutions.  From this
sample, we exclude presidents with very low salaries (< $40,000), interim presidents,
presidents who only worked part of the year, and presidents with missing data.
Demographic and Experience Variables
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We use the American Council of Education’s National President Study for data on age,
gender, seniority, prior presidency, and years of experience at prior presidency.  For some
presidents without information in the ACE data set, we were able to obtain data from
Who’s Who in America or Who’s Who in Education.  The prior presidency variable equals
one if the individual was a president at another institution in at least one of his or her
previous two jobs.  If the individual was a president during both jobs, then years at prior
presidency is a sum of the two tenures.
Clergy
Chronicle of Higher Education’s pay-and-benefit survey provides data on whether a
president is a member of the clergy.
Enrollment
With data from the IPEDS Enrollment Survey, we compute full-time equivalent
enrollment by weighting part times students as 1/3.  Both undergraduate and graduate
students are included.
Endowment per Student.
Data on the market value of endowment assets, from the IPEDS Finance Survey, is
divided by full-time equivalent enrollment.
Average Professors Salary
We compute average professors’ salary from the IPEDS Faculty Salary Survey.  This
variable is computed by summing the expenditures on assistant, associate and full
professors and dividing by the number of professors in these three groups.  When
examining changes in average faculty salary over time, we also conduct analyses using
faculty salary data obtained from the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), as published yearly in Academe.  This data contains information on the average
percentage change in salary for continuing full professors. This variable is superior to the
change in the average salary of professors because the latter is sensitive to new hires,
retirements and faculty turnover. However we also use the latter in our analyses of
presidents’ salary changes because the AAUP data set does not contain data for many of
the institutions in our sample.
Test Scores
24
We use the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges for data on the SAT and ACT
scores for the freshman class of each institution.  This data set contains the 25th and 75th
percentile for both verbal and math scores on the SAT, and 25th and 75th percentiles for
the overall score on the ACT.  To compute one SAT score, we add the 25th percentile of
the verbal score with the 75th verbal, 25th math, and 75th math and divide by 2.  To
compute one ACT score, we add the 25th and 75th percentile of the overall score and
divide by 2.   We do not use test scores that are computed from less than 50% of an
institution’s freshman class.  In our analysis, we use SAT scores whenever possible.  For
institutions with missing SAT scores that have ACT scores, we use convert the ACT
scores to SAT scores.  The conversion is sensitive to the SAT Scale recentering that
changed student scores in the mid-1990s and we take account of the recentering in our
conversion.
Research and Development Expenditures
The National Science Foundation (NSF) Survey of Research and Development
Expenditures provides data on total research and development expenditures.  We only use
this variable for Research and Doctoral institutions.
Timing
Because salary decisions are made in the spring or summer of the preceding academic
year, it is important to use data that are available to trustees at that time.  Therefore, to
examine the 1994-95 presidential compensation data, we use the endowment value as of
July 1, 1994, the enrollment data from Fall 1993, the freshman test score data from Fall
1993, and the research and development data for the 1993-94 academic year. The same
pattern of timing is used with the other years’ presidential compensation data.
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      Table 1
         Mean Salaries and Benefits of Private College and University Presidents
               1992/93 to 1997/98
Salaries Salaries & Benefits
Obs. Mean Std Dev Obs. Mean Std Dev
All Institutions
1992-93 385 $142,428 62,719
1993-94 429 146,603 58,291 384 $174,072 72,708
1994-95 422 156,587 65,054 385 185,073 79,438
1995-96 421 162,570 63,693 391 191,473 85,202
1996-97 427 172,226 71,061 401 200,741 83,122
1997-98 418 185,539 89,247 392 217,232 102,694
Research
1992-93 31 $254,406 92,407
1993-94 34 259,218 66,993 33 $302,086 78,752
1994-95 37 288,685 87,127 37 335,378 97,712
1995-96 36 296,778 55,856 36 353,108 125,583
1996-97 38 314,330 74,142 38 355,682 85,596
1997-98 35 343,469 79,220 34 393,644 89,978
Doctoral
1992-93 32 $184,127 70,388
1993-94 35 184,798 63,517 33 $223,539 92,672
1994-95 33 194,970 64,041 31 234,821 81,002
1995-96 30 207,517 67,572 30 246,906 84,711
1996-97 30 211,668 73,838 30 250,913 84,691
1997-98 30 239,046 88,997 30 278,025 102,304
Comprehensive
1992-93 186 $123,651 49,233
1993-94 211 125,666 39,894 175 $146,901 50,313
1994-95 210 133,718 42,516 182 154,577 52,701
1995-96 206 141,095 47,982 181 161,322 55,932
1996-97 211 150,069 54,518 189 171,786 61,743
1997-98 205 159,933 59,509 187 186,695 72,353
Liberal Arts
1992-93 136 $132,773 31,004
1993-94 149 141,582 41,615 143 $166,366 49,769
1994-95 142 147,068 35,969 135 173,568 45,726
1995-96 149 150,784 33,444 144 177,412 44,427
1996-97 148 159,335 38,972 144 187,405 52,629
1997-98 148 172,899 84,102 141 202,362 92,824
Source: Authors' calculations from data reported in the Chronicle of Higher
Education .  Interim, partial year presidents, and presidents with salaries
below $40,000 not included.
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      Table 2
    Percentage Changes in Presidents' Salaries and Benefits
N Mean Median 25th Percentile75th Percentile
A) Percentage Change in Salary: 1992/93 to 1996/97
All 269 25.5 20.8 12.9 33.0
Research 21 23.2 18.7 15.6 31.6
Doctoral 17 23.3 17.4 11.1 22.3
Comprehensive 141 26.9 22.5 12.7 36.1
Liberal Arts 90 24.3 20.3 13.3 30.6
B) % Change in Salary - % Change in Average Faculty Salary: 1992/93 to 1996/97
All 260 13.5 9.1 0.8 20.9
Research 21 6.5 2.7 -2.1 13.6
Doctoral 16 11.9 6.0 -2.5 14.4
Comprehensive 137 14.9 10.7 -0.7 23.1
Liberal Arts 86 13.1 8.5 2.3 20.3
C) % Change in Salary - % Change in Average Faculty Salary: 1993/94 to 1996/97
All 288 8.8 5.1 -1.9 14.2
Research 26 8.2 5.4 1.1 13.5
Doctoral 17 14.2 1.4 -3.8 11.3
Comprehensive 150 9.9 5.8 -2.0 19.9
Liberal Arts 95 6.3 4.8 -0.8 12.3
D) % Change in Salary and Benefits - % Change in Average Faculty Salary: 1993/94 to 1996/97
All 257 9.4 5.8 -2.3 16.1
Research 25 8.6 6.7 -2.6 13.4
Doctoral 16 21.4 4.7 -1.5 19.0
Comprehensive 124 9.5 6.5 -3.1 18.4
Liberal Arts 92 7.4 4.9 -1.5 13.6
Source: Authors' calculations from data reported in the Chronicle of Higher
Education .  Interim, partial year presidents, and presidents with salaries
below $40,000 not included.
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Table 3
                   Mobility of Private College and University Presidents
          1992/93 to 1996/97
     Academic Year
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97
Presidents in the sample 484 477 474 470
Who in the next year:
1) stayed at the same institution 429 430 442 424
2) moved to another institution 4 0 2 1
3) left the sample of institutions* 48 42 26 41
4) their institution left the sample 0 3 4 4
Source: Authors' calculations from data reported in the Chronicle of Higher
Education .  Interim presidents are not included
* Information on the post presidency status of many of the individuals who left the sample 
of institutions was obtained from Who's Who in America, exhaustive searches of the 
World Wide Web and a telephone survey of the presidents' offices at their former 
institutions conducted by Cornell's Computer Assisted Survey Team (CAST) in May,2000"
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                       Table 4
         Median Salaries of Presidents of Public and Private Institutions in 1999:
By Operating Budgets and Enrollment
Public Private Private/Public ratio
By Budgets
Median Size Institution $50.5 million$34.8 million 0.689
Median Institution's President Salary$132,098 $176,800 1.338
By Enrollments
Median Size Institution 4,532 1,560 0.344
Median Institution's President Salary$132,196 $175,900 1.331
Source: 1999-2000 Administrative Compensation Survey  (Washington DC: College
and University Personnel Association, 2000)- table 2, 3, 6, and 7.
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        Table 5
Mean Values of Private College and University 
          Presidents' Characteristics in 1996.
Research &
All Doctorate Comprehensive Liberal Arts
Seniority 8.2 6.2 9.1 7.9
Age at Start of Position 48 51 47 48
Clergy .15 .15 .24 .02
Female .18 .08 .21 .21
Prior Presidency .24 .31 .23 .23
n 378 72 185 121
Source: Authors computations from data on the presidents found in the 
American Council on Education's The American President data file, supple-
mented by information obtained from Marquis Who's Who in American 
Education: 1996-97  (New Providence, NJ: Reed Reference Publishing, 1995)
and Marquis Who's Who in America: 1997  (New Providence, NJ: Reed
Reference Publications, 1996)
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        Table 6
        President Salary and Compensation Equationsa
                     1992/92 to 1996/97 sample
                     (absolute value t-statistics)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.0001 0.0011 0.0010 0.0004 0.0000
(0.1) (0.8) (0.8) (0.4) (0.0)
Female -0.0076 0.0176 0.0008 -0.0105 0.0145
(0.5) (1.0) (0.1) (0.7) (0.8)
Seniority 0.0058 0.0075 0.0051 0.0063 0.0067
(5.1) (5.5) (4.5) (5.3) (5.9)
Prior Presidency 0.0054 -0.0100 0.0270 0.0061 0.0048
(0.3) (0.5) (1.3) (0.3) (0.2)
Years at Prior Presidency 0.0057 0.0070 0.0042 0.0056 0.0065
(2.1) (2.4) (1.5) (2.1) (2.3)
Clergy -0.1938 -0.2163 -0.1741 -0.1962
(10.1) (9.9) (8.7) (9.7)
Professor Average Salary 0.4896 0.4347 0.4675 0.4727
(3.5) (3.0) (3.2) (3.1)
Endowment Per Student 0.0313 0.0424 0.0497 0.0329 0.0345
(3.6) (4.3) (6.9) (3.6) (3.9)
Gifts Per Student 0.0021 0.0037 0.0011 0.0016 0.0064
(0.5) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4) (1.6)
Enrollment 0.1415 0.1569 0.1890 0.1401 0.1494
(7.1) (7.0) (15.5) (6.8) (7.0)
Freshman Test Scores 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002
(2.2) (2.3) (7.3) (2.4) (1.6)
R&D Expenditures 0.0138 0.0071 0.0090 0.0147 0.0112
(1.3) (0.6) (0.8) (1.3) (1.0)
Research/Doctoral University 0.1245 0.1311 0.1487 0.1322 0.1315
(2.5) (2.2) (3.2) (2.6) (2.6)
Comprehensive University 0.0154 0.0190 0.0129 0.0222 0.0196
(0.9) (0.9) (0.7) (1.3) (1.1)
Number of observations 2074 1552 2074 1930 1851
R-squared 0.6456 0.6456 0.605 0.6488 0.6413
where (1) Includes all Presidents discussed in Table 1, salary is dependent variable; (2) same as (1), with
Salary + Benefits is the depended variable; (3) same as (1); (4) same as (1) does not include presidents in 
their last year of presidency; (5) same as (1), does not include presidents who are clergy
aAll regressions used robust standard errors.  Also included in each equation are year dichotomous 
variables and dichotomous variables for nonreporting of Age, Endowment per Student, Average Professor 
Salary, Test Scores, Research and Development Revenue, and Prior Presidency.
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     Table 7
  Presidents Salary Equations: 1992/93 to 1996/97 Samplea
           Institutions Segmented by Institutional Type
     (absolute value t-statistics)
       Research and 
          Doctorate    Comprehensive         Liberal Arts
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Age 0.0091 0.0111 -0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0029
(2.6) (3.2) (1.7) (0.3) (2.3) (2.4)
Female -0.0952 -0.1155 -0.0548 -0.0192 0.0353 0.0347
(1.4) (1.5) (2.7) (0.9) (2.3) (2.2)
Seniority -0.0016 -0.0024 0.0103 0.0084 0.0049 0.0048
(0.3) (0.5) (6.2) (5.0) (3.8) (3.6)
Prior Presidency 0.1367 0.0671 -0.0520 -0.0280 0.0360 0.0428
(2.0) (1.0) (1.8) (0.9) (1.4) (1.5)
Years at Prior Presidency -0.0109 -0.0067 0.0162 0.0152 0.0020 0.0019
(1.9) (1.2) (3.7) (3.1) (0.5) (0.5)
Clergy -0.1335 -0.1664 -0.2100 -0.2006 -0.0475 -0.0105
(4.0) (4.7) (9.2) (8.3) (0.7) (0.1)
Professor Average Salary 0.6498 0.6825 0.2011
(4.6) (10.3) (1.6)
Endowment Per Student 0.0087 0.0353 0.0073 0.0214 0.0765 0.0824
(0.6) (2.2) (0.9) (2.4) (6.9) (8.7)
Gifts Per Student 0.0029 0.0118 0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0034
(0.2) (0.8) (0.6) (0.1) (0.4) (0.4)
Enrollment 0.0718 0.1074 0.1315 0.2404 0.1928 0.2063
(3.0) (4.5) (6.7) (15.3) (10.2) (14.7)
Freshman Test Scores -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007
(2.5) (0.5) (2.5) (5.2) (2.6) (6.2)
R&D Expenditures 0.0506 0.0477
(3.4) (3.2)
Number of observations 333 333 1020 1020 721 721
R-squared 0.4792 0.4343 0.5415 0.4705 0.6048 0.5867
where each equation includes all Presidents discussed in Table 1, salary is dependent variable.
aAll regressions used robust standard errors.  Also included in each equation are year dichotomous 
variables and dichotomous variables for nonreporting of Age, Endowment per Student, Average Professor 
Salary, Test Scores, Research and Development Revenue, and Prior Presidency.
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        Table 8
    President Salary and Compensation Change Equationsa
                     (absolute value t-statistics)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.0006 0.0011 0.0007 0.0014 0.0003
(0.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) (0.1)
Female 0.0325 0.0320 0.0341 0.0391 0.0351
(1.0) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.0)
Seniority 0.0041 0.0000 0.0043 0.0041 0.0058
(1.8) (0.0) (1.9) (1.8) (2.6)
Prior Presidency -0.0980 -0.0483 -0.0950 -0.0973 -0.1048
(2.1) (1.2) (2.0) (2.2) (2.2)
Years at Prior Presidency 0.0088 0.0056 0.0096 0.0090 0.0095
(1.5) (1.1) (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
Clergy -0.0913 -0.0368 -0.1038 -0.1030
(2.5) (1.0) (2.9) (2.9)
Professor Average Salary 0.4677 0.1438 0.4596 0.2096
(3.2) (0.9) (3.1) (1.4)
Endowment Per Student 0.0325 0.0000 0.0339 -0.0304 0.0614
(1.0) (0.0) (1.1) (0.9) (1.9)
Gifts Per Student 0.0417 -0.0003 0.0411 0.0589 0.0312
(1.5) (0.0) (1.4) (2.0) (1.1)
Enrollment 0.1540 -0.0036 0.1817 0.1310 0.1170
(2.1) (0.1) (2.5) (1.9) (1.6)
Freshman Test Scoresb 0.0002 0.0000 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0023
(0.1) (0.0) (0.3) (0.1) (0.8)
R&D Expenditures 0.1941 0.2425 0.1951 0.1912 0.2098
(2.9) (4.2) (2.8) (2.9) (3.2)
Research/Doctoral University -0.0741 0.0078 -0.0565 -0.0759 -0.0583
(0.9) (0.1) (0.7) (0.9) (0.7)
Comprehensive University 0.0188 0.0268 0.0212 0.0170 0.0298
(0.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.7) (1.2)
Number of observations 267 268 267 238 238
Adj. R-squared 0.0959 0.0428 0.0657 0.1289 0.081
where (1) Includes all Presidents who remained at the same institution from 1992/93-1996/97, salary is 
dependent variable; (2) Includes all Presidents who remained at the same institution from 1993/94-1996/97, 
Salary + Benefits is the depended variable; (3) same as (1); (4) same as (1) does not include presidents in 
their last year of presidency in 1996/97; (5) same as (1), does not include presidents who are clergy.
aAlso included in each equation are dichotomous variables for nonreporting of Age, Endowment per 
Student, Average Professor Salary, Test Scores, Research and Development Revenue, and Prior 
Presidency
bCoefficient has been multiplied by 10.
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     Table 9
               Presidents Salary Change Equationsa
           Institutions Segmented by Institutional Type
     (absolute value t-statistics)
       Research and 
          Doctorate    Comprehensive         Liberal Arts
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Age -0.0053 0.0019 0.0034 0.0037 -0.0066 -0.0068
(0.8) (0.3) (1.0) (1.1) (2.0) (2.0)
Female 0.1542 0.2038 0.0047 0.0046 0.0376 0.0279
(1.1) (1.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.9) (0.6)
Seniority 0.0141 0.0111 0.0075 0.0076 0.0038 0.0042
(1.9) (1.3) (2.0) (2.0) (1.2) (1.3)
Prior Presidency -0.0371 0.0429 -0.1012 -0.0998 -0.1055 -0.0659
(0.3) (0.3) (1.5) (1.5) (1.2) (0.7)
Years at Prior Presidency 0.0111 0.0061 0.0137 0.0151 0.0042 0.0002
(0.9) (0.4) (1.4) (1.6) (0.4) (0.0)
Clergy -0.0344 -0.0001 -0.1278 -0.1373 0.1295 0.0653
(0.4) (0.0) (2.6) (2.8) (0.9) (0.5)
Professor Average Salary 1.1095 0.5077 0.5413
(2.9) (2.1) (2.2)
Endowment Per Student -0.3171 0.0685 0.0633 0.0617 0.0648 0.0647
(1.4) (0.3) (1.5) (1.5) (0.8) (0.8)
Gifts Per Student 0.0139 0.0170 0.0315 0.0342 -0.0208 -0.0237
(0.1) (0.1) (0.7) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6)
Enrollment -0.2024 -0.2045 0.2221 0.2577 0.0010 0.0521
(0.9) (0.9) (2.1) (2.6) (0.0) (0.3)
Freshman Test Scoresb 0.0019 0.0097 0.0030 0.0022 -0.0005 0.0001
(0.3) (1.4) (0.6) (0.5) (0.1) (0.0)
R&D Expenditures 0.1980 0.2547
(2.9) (3.4)
Number of observations 38 38 140 140 89 89
Adj. R-squared 0.3597 0.1502 0.0938 0.0764 0.051 -0.0062
where each equation includes all Presidents who remained at the same institution from 1992/93-1996/97, 
salary is the dependent variable.
aAlso included in each equation are dichotomous variables for nonreporting of Age, Endowment per 
Student, Average Professor Salary, Test Scores, Research and Development Revenue, and Prior 
Presidency
bCoefficient has been multiplied by 10.
